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Morris Goldstein and Daniel Xie provide a very comprehensive presentation 
and discussion on the impact of the financial crisis on emerging Asia . In order to 
try to add some value to this discussion, I will focus on what is primarily a sin-
gle issue, though there are a number of aspects to it . Figure 1C in the Goldstein 
and Xie paper summarizes the main message of what I want to focus on . The 
figure plots annualized growth rates for exports of emerging Asian economies . 
Since the prices of exports, which are predominantly manufactured rather than 
primary products, did not have a great deal of movement during this period, 
the figure effectively describes real export growth . What is clear for Asia is 
that exports wiggled around, but essentially were flat from 2003 until late 2008, 
when exports collapsed .
In terms of this metric, the crisis and its impact on emerging Asia occurred 
mainly in late 2008 and early 2009 . This was well after the financial difficul-
ties in the subprime market in the United States that began to emerge in early 
2007 deepened further in the summer of 2007 and intensified with the Bear 
Stearns episode in 2008 . It was only beginning around the middle of Septem-
ber of 2008 with the demise of Lehman Brothers that the global financial cri-
sis really stepped up in magnitude . Indeed if we look at measures like the Vix 
index, a measure of volatility in the stock market, it fluctuated between roughly   
8 and 30 for a number of years and then suddenly shot up to almost 90 . This 
unprecedented movement and changes in many other indicators of financial 
market stress at the end of 2008 occurred in a way that we had never seen 
before in the postwar era . So in discussing the effects of the global financial 
crisis, it makes a great deal of difference if one is talking about the effects of 
the crisis beginning in September 2008 or about the longer period of financial 
stress that began in mid-2007 .
Now, we might also note that some of the other emerging market areas 
show a slightly different pattern in terms of exports . For Africa and the Middle 
East, nominal export growth rose in late 2007 and the first part of 2008 as the 
result of an acceleration of global inflation in commodity prices that occurred 
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just before the global economic collapse and intensification of the financial crisis 
that occurred in the latter part of 2008 .
Let me discuss further the timing of the financial crisis and the timing of 
the impact on emerging Asia . The first key point is that, while a great deal of 
attention has focused on the global financial crisis, I think that to a greater 
extent than is widely appreciated we have seen a classic boom-and-bust cycle 
in the world economy, to which has been added some elements of typical finan-
cial stress, augmented by the extraordinary financial market turbulence expe-
rienced in the fall of 2008 . So we need to understand the global crisis as part of 
a broader cyclical phenomenon .
World economic growth slowed very substantially in 2001 and 2002 and 
accelerated beginning in early 2003 into the 4 to 5 percent range through 2007 . 
This first phase of the general global expansion ended around mid-2006 . Note 
that U .S . gross domestic product (GDP) also accelerated in this period, as did 
GDP growth in emerging Asia and most regions of the world economy . It was 
a very broad-based global economic expansion, with inflation remaining gen-
erally very well subdued at least through 2006 and 2007, despite some upward 
movement in commodity prices . In Asia, growing exports were a very impor-
tant part of the economic boom . In the United States the housing sector was 
booming with residential investment (having suffered no downturn in the reces-
sion of 2001) and continuing to expand rapidly through the end of 2005 . Home 
prices escalated rapidly, reaching a peak in the middle of 2006 . With U .S . domes-
tic demand growing somewhat more rapidly than real GDP, there was a corre-
sponding further deterioration in the U .S . current account defi  cit . So in phase 
one there was a general boom without inflation .
In phase two, the U .S . economy slowed significantly, especially in terms of 
domestic demand growth . Domestic demand growth from the middle of 2006 to 
the end of 2007 was barely more than 1 percent at an annual rate . GDP growth 
also slowed to a little bit more than 2 percent . Improvement in U .S . real net 
exports, aided by the continuing boom in the rest of the world economy, was 
the key reason why the U .S . did not slow more or fall into recession during this 
stage of the business cycle . So we see a differential movement between the U .S . 
and most of the rest of the world economy in this six-quarter period from mid-
2006 through 2007 . Emerging Asia on the whole continued to do quite well, as 
did Western Europe and Japan to an extent . However, global inflation began to 
accelerate towards the end of this period, with 12-month inflation rates pick-
ing up in most of the world economy . The U .S . was a bit of an exception because 
core inflation in the U .S . showed very little response to the general rise of prices 
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conduct of economic policy . The Federal Reserve, concerned about both devel-
opments in the financial sector and the weakening of economic activity, started 
easing monetary policy in the fall of 2007 . In contrast, almost all other countries 
around the world were either maintaining relatively firm monetary policies or 
tightening policies further at this stage .
Moving to phase three, during the first eight or nine months of 2008 the 
U .S . economy was in recession according to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research . Other countries generally continued to expand through the first quar-
ter of 2008, and inflation worldwide continued to surge with the oil prices mov-
ing to new highs . However, in the second quarter of 2008, global GDP growth 
began to slow substantially . Most other industrial countries experienced nega-
tive growth, as did a number of emerging market countries such as Korea and 
Singapore . Though growth in most of emerging Asia including China remained 
positive, the overall global economy entered into recession by the third quarter 
of 2008 . The United States contributed to this global recession through spill-
overs from its financial crisis and its domestic recession . But the global recession 
was also partly a result of the global tightening of monetary policy implemented 
to combat rapidly rising commodity price inflation earlier in 2007 . In addition, 
the remarkable upsurge in world oil prices dramatically cut the real value of 
consumer income and spending power in the U .S . and many other economies .
So the deepening global economic slowdown in the first eight or nine months 
of 2008 was certainly not exclusively due to the financial crisis up to that point . 
It was also the result of cyclical events, including the upsurge in oil prices and 
tightening of monetary policy abroad . Then on top of it all, we added this remark-
able, unprecedented collapse in the functioning of key global credit markets 
and economic activity around the world . This showed up in everybody’s GDP 
growth rates in the fourth quarter of 2008, as growth rates around the world 
all dropped very substantially from where they had been in previous years . The 
global decline in real GDP by more than 6 percent at an annual rate is unprece-
dented in the postwar history of the world economy . So it is there where we see 
the impact of the global financial crisis .
This has several implications . First, what we are ultimately going to think 
about this crisis is probably going to have to wait until another conference to 
consider further because a great deal depends upon whether, as I expect, we 
will get a V-shaped recovery or we have a long period of very sluggish eco-
nomic recovery including in the United States and most industrial countries . 
We just do not know the answer to that yet but it will surely influence how we 
think about this episode . Just as if, had we held this conference a year ago, it 
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we wouldn’t have seen the economic impact of the collapse of global financial 
markets .
A second point is, I do not fully understand what caused the great global 
financial crisis of the fall of 2008 . Many people say it was the failure of Lehman 
Brothers . But that is like saying that the assassination of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand caused the First World War . I think the current situation is more 
complex than that . The demise of Lehman Brothers may have been a trigger-
ing event, but it is unclear why it triggered such a remarkable collapse of mar-
ket function . How and why that happened is something that requires greater 
explanation .
Finally, there is the question of, what should we do about all of this? I feel a 
little uneasy in that there are many proposals for reform and reconstruction of 
our financial system . Almost all of those proposals were out on the table before 
the Lehman Brothers collapse . So they could not have been formulated with 
that experience in mind . Thus the question is, how do these proposals need to 
be adapted in light of what we should have learned from that remarkable event . 
If we’re talking about the economic impact on the crisis of emerging Asia, we 
are primarily talking about the impact of the crisis from that point onward, not 
the crisis before that time .